http://www.meforum.
Jemaah Islamiyah Adopts the Hezbollah Model
Assessing Hezbollah's Influence
by Zachary Abuza
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2009, pp. 15-26
http://www.meforum.
Islamist terrorism may have its roots in the Middle East, but it has long
since expanded globally. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, is no
exception. Jemaah Islamiyah has for more than fifteen years fought to
transform Indonesia into an Islamist state. In recent years, its terrorist
campaign has suffered setbacks. As Jemaah Islamiyah regroups, it builds upon
the experience of Middle East terrorist groups. From Al-Qaeda, it adopts
philosophical underpinnings that guide its dual strategy. From Hamas and
Hezbollah, it borrows an "inverse triangle model" in which a broad network
of social services supports a smaller jihadist core, and from Saudi Arabia
and the Persian Gulf emirates it adopts a model of charities and NGOs that
help Jemaah Islamiyah advance its jihadist goals.
What Is Jemaah Islamiyah?
http://www.meforum.
Jemaah Islamiyah's engagement in politics is a cynical short-term tactic in
its long-term strategy to eradicate democracy. Founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir
has said, "The democratic system is not the Islamic way. It is forbidden.
Democracy is based on people, but the state must be based on God's law-I
call it Allahcracy."
Jemaah Islamiyah was founded sometime in 1992 or 1993 by former members of
Darul Islam, an Islamist movement that emerged during Indonesia's fight for
independence from the Netherlands but that continued armed struggle for more
than a decade after independence. Members of Darul Islam grew especially
frustrated with their political emasculation under Muhammad Suharto's rule
(1965-98). Jemaah Islamiyah's founders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir, conceptualized the group as a covert organization that would
topple the secular state through a combination of political agitation and
violence. Jemaah Islamiyah's primary founding document, Pedoman Umum
Perjuangan al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah (PUPJI, The general guidebook for the
struggle of Jemaah Islamiyah) outlines the role of clandestine cells and
describes the Islamist struggle in terms of guerilla warfare. By the end of
the decade, Jemaah Islamiyah had become an Al-Qaeda affiliate, receiving
financial and material support from the group. Several top Jemaah Islamiyah
operatives even received instruction in Afghan training camps.[1]
<http://www.meforum.
n1> Soon after its founding, Jemaah Islamiyah became an Al-Qaeda affiliate.
Jemaah Islamiyah sought advantage from the collapse of Suharto's
authoritarian rule and Indonesia's descent into a chaotic decentralized
democracy. Beginning in 1998, Jemaah Islamiyah launched the "uhud project,"
whose goal was ridding regions of the country of both Christians and Hindus
in order to establish pure Muslim enclaves, governed by Shari'a (Islamic
law). Its two paramilitaries, Laskar Mujahidin in the Moluccas and Laskar
Jundullah in Central Sulawesi, engaged in sectarian bloodletting against
Christians and Hindus until, in 2002, the government was able to broker the
Malino accords, enabling a fragile truce. Meanwhile, Jemaah Islamiyah began
a bombing campaign in 2000, killing several hundred people, including 202 in
one attack in October 2002 at a Bali disco.
Indonesian authorities fought back. Security forces arrested more than 450
Jemaah Islamiyah members, prosecuted over 250 terrorists, and eviscerated
the organization'
More than a dozen hardened Jemaah Islamiyah leaders remain at large; some,
such as Noordin Muhammad Top, have significant organizational skills.
Others, such as Zulkarnaen and Dulmatin, have technical and military
capabilities. As recently as June 2008, police raids have netted large
caches of bombs and bomb-making material,[2]
<http://www.meforum.
n2> suggesting that Jemaah Islamiyah's commitment to terrorism remains
high.
Justifying a Soft Power Strategy
With the exception of Ali Ghufreon (known also as Mukhlas), awaiting
execution for his role in the 2002 Bali bombing, Southeast Asian jihadists
have no important homegrown theoreticians. Jemaah Islamiyah has filled the
gap by drawing upon the works of Al-Qaeda's three most important
thinkers-Abu Musab as-Suri, whose main work is the 2002 tract "Call to
Worldwide Islamic Resistance"; Abu Bakr Naji, who wrote the 2004 document
"The Management of Savagery"; and Abdul Qadir (Dr. Fadl), who, in November
2007, penned "Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World."
Together, these authors provide theoretical sustenance to Jemaah Islamiyah's
revitalization of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, a civil society organization
affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah, and other overt organizations. Suri, for
example, argued that Al-Qaeda's blanket opposition to democracy was
counterproductive and that jihadists should instead work with Islamist
political leaders and parties. Naji concurred. "If we meditate on the factor
common to the movements which have remained, we find there is political
action in addition to military action," he explained. "We urge that the
leaders work to master political science just as they would to master
military science." Naji's specific recommendations that jihadists be able to
justify their actions in Islamic law and reach the people directly without
reliance on state media parallel the strategy implemented in Egypt by Sayyid
Qutb who, in the Muslim Brotherhood, combined a mass-based movement and a
network of covert cells. Jemaah Islamiyah has also adopted the substance of
Qadir's tract which argued that most terrorism is illegal by Islamic law,
that violent jihad should only be waged in defense, and that fighting Muslim
leaders, even those decried as apostates, is illegal unless rebellion would
lead to tangible improvement in Muslims' lives.[3]
<http://www.meforum.
n3>
Today, Jemaah Islamiyah pursues a three-front strategy of recruitment and
expansion of cells, religious indoctrination and training of its members,
and instigation of sectarian conflict. Indeed, Noordin Mohammad Top wrote an
82-page tract about how to establish jihadi cells on a six-month timetable.
The PUPJI outlines the three phases of jihad: iman (faith of individuals)
hijrah (building a base of operations), and then jihad qital (fighting the
enemies of Islam). One section of the PUPJI, "Al-Manhaj al-Harakiy Li
Iqomatid Dien (The general manual for operations),
Islamiyah can engage in overt activities in order to proselytize and build a
base of support. But the bulk of the document is a guide for clandestine
operations and cell-building, the path Jemaah Islamiyah leaders most closely
follow.
The Rebound
After the Indonesian crackdown that began in 2003, Jemaah Islamiyah reverted
to recruitment and indoctrination for several years, but it has again begun
to build a base of operations, especially in Central Sulawesi and the
Moluccas. As the group sought to recover from the blows inflicted by
Indonesian counterterror forces, debate raged about how to move forward. The
International Crisis Group's Sydney Jones, a leading expert on Indonesia,
describes factional rifts inside Jemaah Islamiyah between proponents of
sectarian bloodletting and those who wish to target the Indonesian
government and Western targets.[4]
<http://www.meforum.
n4> Such strategies, however, are not mutually exclusive. Since 2004,
Jemaah Islamiyah has increased bombings, assassinations, and raids on
military and police facilities. The November 2005 beheadings of three Hindu
schoolgirls was meant to undermine confidence in the state.[5]
<http://www.meforum.
n5>
By provoking sectarian attacks, Jemaah Islamiyah can broaden its definition
of a defensive jihad. Such vigilantism enables it to contend that Jakarta
has abdicated responsibility by not coming to the defense of the Muslim
community, enabling Jemaah Islamiyah to pursue its goals with greater
popular support. Since mid-2006, the Indonesian police have taken seriously
the threat of sectarian violence after uncovering documents emphasizing the
centrality of sectarian bloodletting to Jemaah Islamiyah's efforts to
regroup.
Religious indoctrination has become a parallel component of Jemaah Islamiyah
strategy. The group has sent high-level cells to Pakistan for advanced
religious training. In 2003, for example, Jemaah Islamiyah sent nineteen
children or brothers of high-ranking Jemaah Islamiyah members to study in
the Lashkar e-Toiba madrasa, an Islamic school in Lahore, Pakistan, which
has ties to the Taliban. Although Pakistani security arrested and deported
them in fall 2004,[6]
<http://www.meforum.
n6> Jemaah Islamiyah has been able to conduct more such training in
Indonesia where the group runs a network of approximately sixty madrasas and
has launched its own publishing houses: Al-Alaq, the Arafah Group, the
Al-Qowam Group, the Aqwam Group, and Kafayeh Cipta Media.[7]
<http://www.meforum.
n7>
Such a strategy is not unique to Indonesia and, indeed, has been frequently
practiced in the Middle East. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood regrouped in
the wake of the Egyptian government's mid-1990s crackdown by concentrating
on mosques, publishing, and proselytizing.
<http://www.meforum.
n8> Likewise, for more than a decade before Israeli Arabs became involved
in Palestinian violence, the Islamic Movement within Israel maintained its
own educational institutions and publication houses in the Israeli town of
Umm al-Fahm.[9]
<http://www.meforum.
n9> Lebanon, too, has become home to a number of Islamist publishing
houses.
Jemaah Islamiyah's Inverse Triangle
Like many Middle Eastern Islamist groups, Jemaah Islamiyah has embraced the
inverse triangle in which a broad range of charities and nongovernmental
agencies (NGOs) serve as cover for a narrower terrorist mission. And like
many Islamist groups in the Middle East, as Jemaah Islamiyah regroups, it
shows no intention of abandoning its core ideology even as some Indonesian
officials wishfully see moderation where none exists. As the organization
seeks to rebuild, it becomes an example of how Al-Qaeda affiliates, beaten
back by successful counterterror strategies, regroup using both the
democratic process they simultaneously fight and the legitimacy naively
bestowed by the international community on any organization that calls
itself a nongovernmental organization.
Jemaah Islamiyah has adopted a Hezbollah model of social organization in
which most of the group's activities are overt charitable work and provision
of social services even as a component of the organization clandestinely
pursues terrorism. Beginning in the 1980s, Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shi'i
political group founded by Iran in the wake of the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, began to construct a large network of educational institutions and
social services both to complement their military wing and to serve as a
recruitment tool. Slowly, Hezbollah built a state within a state in Lebanon,
preventing anyone within its territory the option of remaining outside the
group's influence. Even as Hezbollah conducts terrorist activities against
Israel and within Lebanon itself, many in the international community refuse
to define the group as a terrorist organization, in effect arguing that
social work is exculpatory.
<http://www.meforum.
n10>
Hamas has implemented the same model. While Hamas is a lethal terrorist
organization that has employed at least sixty suicide bombings since the
second intifada began in September 2000, many Palestinians and Europeans
argue that the group's network of schools, orphanages, clinics, and social
welfare organizations bestows some legitimacy.[
<http://www.meforum.
n11> In Iraq, too, militia leaders pursue the same strategy. Abdul Aziz
Hakim, the leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has employed not
only the Badr Corps, which has sponsored terrorism and conducted violent
operations, but also the Shahid al-Mihrab Foundation, a charitable
organization run by his son, Amar al-Hakim.
In Jemaah Islamiyah's case, the base of the inverse triangle is Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia, an umbrella organization for political parties, NGOs,
civil society organizations, and individuals committed to transforming
Indonesia into an Islamic state.[12]
<http://www.meforum.
n12> Created in 1999, the organization has an office in Yogyakarta,
publishes conspiracy-laden and vehemently anti-Semitic and anti-American
books through Wihdah Press and its own magazine, Risalah Mujahidin, lobbies
political officials, and in 2001 and 2003, held high-profile national
conferences.
<http://www.meforum.
n13> Muhammad Jibril, son of Jemaah Islamiyah leader Muhammad Iqbal
Abdurrahman, runs Ar-Rahman Media, its multimedia publishing house. The use
of diverse institutions is deliberate, even as the antipathy toward
Indonesian democracy is pronounced. Muhammad Jibril told Al-Jazeera,
We want an Islamic state where Islamic law is not just in the books but
enforced, and enforced with determination. There is no space and no room for
democratic consultation.
<http://www.meforum.
n14>
At a November 2006 sermon at a mosque in Kediri, East Java, Jemaah Islamiyah
founder Ba'asyir urged his followers to go abroad to wage jihad, though
without explaining why. "If you want to go on jihad, do not do it here
[Indonesia] but in the southern Philippines or even in Iraq." He said the
Bali bombers were legitimate jihadis even if their jihad was "not at the
right time or place." Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia may have switched tactics
with regard to the desirability of terrorism inside Indonesia, but they have
not altered their commitment to violent jihad.
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has to some extent become Jemaah Islamiyah's
equivalent of Sinn Fein, the political party that existed solely to mirror
the Irish Republican Army's aims. Jemaah Islamiyah uses Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia to achieve whatever aims it can through the democratic process.
Thus, the Majelis Mujahidin advocates for Islamic law components to all
major bills and laws. It seeks, for example, to push Indonesian penal law
into conformity with Islamic law[15]
<http://www.meforum.
n15> and has urged local Islamic communities to lobby regional
representatives for Islamic law at the local level.[16]
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n16> It is a strategy that is both well organized and effective. Nearly
forty regional governments have taken steps to implement Islamic law,
regulate interaction between men and women, obligate Qur'an reading, and ban
alcohol.[17]
<http://www.meforum.
n17> The group has also pressured the media to replace secular programming
with Islamic programming, legislating to force civil servants to wear
Islamic dress, and mandating Arabic literacy.
Jemaah Islamiyah's engagement in the political process is a cynical
short-term tactic in its longer-term strategy to eradicate democracy. "The
democratic system is not the Islamic way," Ba'asyir explained. "It is
forbidden. Democracy is based on people, but the state must be based on
God's law-I call it Allahcracy."
<http://www.meforum.
n18> "Islam's victory can only come though da'wa and jihad, not
elections."[
<http://www.meforum.
n19> Many of Jemaah Islamiyah leaders hold concurrent positions in Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia, giving themselves a patina of legitimacy and political
cover. Since his release from prison in October 2004, Abdurrahman (Abu
Jibril), for example, has used Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia as his base of
operations. But his message has not necessarily changed. In one recruiting
film produced by Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Abdurrahman calls on his
congregants to wage a violent jihad. Armed with a pistol extended into the
air he exclaimed, "You can't just have the Qur'an without the steel. You
will bring down the steel."[20]
<http://www.meforum.
n20> His younger brother remains Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's director of
daily operations.[
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n21>
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has grown increasingly confident and combative
in dealing with the government, which it accuses of leading a witch hunt
against Muslims. Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia has begun issuing "summons," or
official complaints, to the police in order to intimidate them and influence
investigations of suspected terrorists. In May 2006, for example, it issued
a summons to the Indonesian National Police specialized counterterrorism
unit, Detachment 88, for their raid on a Jemaah Islamiyah safe house in
Central Java, in which two suspects were killed and two others were
arrested.[22]
<http://www.meforum.
n22> As Ba'asyir said, "The struggle for Islam can only come through crisis
and confrontation.
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n23>
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia also serves as a link between Jemaah Islamiyah
and Saudi financiers. Many Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia leaders hold or have
held concurrent positions in Saudi charities and their Indonesian
counterparts that have been used to support terrorist activities.[
<http://www.meforum.
n24> These include the Saudi Al-Haramain and the International Islamic
Relief Organization. Two Indonesian charities, KOMPAK and the Medical
Emergency Relief Charity, respectively serve as their counterpart or
executing agencies. While U.S. Executive Order 13224 and the U.N.'s 1267
Committee on January 22, 2004, designated the Indonesian branch of
Al-Haramain as a funder of terrorism, four months after the designation,
Al-Haramain was operating openly in East Java.[25]
<http://www.meforum.
n25>
KOMPAK
Jemaah Islamiyah used or co-opted many of these charities between 1999 and
2001, during a period of sectarian bloodletting in the Molucca Islands
between Jemaah Islamiyah's paramilitaries and Christian and Hindu citizens.
Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, a hard-line Islamist offshoot of the
Muhammadiyah, the national Islamic organization, established KOMPAK in late
1998 ostensibly to provide relief assistance to people in conflict areas,
such as Kalimantan, the Moluccas, and Central Sulawesi. It immediately
partnered with the Saudi International Islamic Relief Organization although
it recently suffered a setback when, on August 3, 2006, the U.S. Treasury
Department designated the Indonesian branch of the International Islamic
Relief Organization, along with the Philippine branch and a Saudi director
of the International Islamic Relief Organization, for financing terrorism,
including Al-Qaeda. The United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee acted
in concert although it did not designate the Indonesian branch of the
International Islamic Relief Organization as a financier of terrorism until
November 9, 2006.[26]
<http://www.meforum.
n26> While KOMPAK did not engage in conflict directly, its aid won support
for Jemaah Islamiyah and its paramilitary organizations such as Laskar
Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin.
Of the thirteen regional directors of KOMPAK, at least three were top-level
Jemaah Islamiyah operatives.[
<http://www.meforum.
n27> KOMPAK, however, only came to the assistance of Muslim communities,
which it worked to radicalize. KOMPAK officials, while acknowledging that
they operate in regions struck by sectarian conflict such as Aceh, Poso, the
Moluccas, and Bangunan Beton Sumatra, assert they alleviate the crises and
provide necessary relief. They deny any links to jihad activities.[
<http://www.meforum.
n28> In 2003, Indonesian forces arrested several KOMPAK leaders for their
involvement in sectarian violence and terrorism; several others went
underground.
As with other jihadist organizations and corollary charities in North
Africa, Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere, KOMPAK's support is not entirely
indigenous. It serves as the executing agency of many Saudi and Persian Gulf
funds, including from Al-Haramain and the International Islamic Relief
Organization.
Aris Munandar, a top KOMPAK and Al-Haramain official, was a key financial
conduit between Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. Agus Dwikarna not only served
as head of KOMPAK for South Sulawesi but also was the regional branch
officer for the International Islamic Relief Organization and treasurer of
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Munandar, who was a leading member of Jemaah
Islamiyah, used KOMPAK to support both the sectarian bloodletting in the
Moluccas and Sulawesi and Al-Qaeda operatives' training of Jemaah Islamiyah
members.[29]
<http://www.meforum.
n29> KOMPAK also produced a number of jihadi videos for fundraising and
recruitment purposes.
The Indonesian crackdown broke KOMPAK into disparate cells, but the
organization did not cease its commitment to radicalization. One such
splinter group, KOMPAK in Ambon, conducted the October 2005 Bali II
bombings. Indonesian prosecutors believe that one mid-level Jemaah Islamiyah
operative, Abdullah Sonata, received 11 million rupiah (US$15,000) and
100,000 Saudi riyals ($36,500) in 2004 from a Saudi named Syeikh Abu
Muhammad to finance militant operations and to send Jemaah Islamiyah
terrorists to Mindanao. Other KOMPAK members acquired weaponry with which to
instigate a new wave of sectarian bloodletting in Central Sulawesi and the
Moluccas.
<http://www.meforum.
n30> [30] Dulmatin, who is one of Jemaah Islamiyah's leading operatives and
has been in hiding in the southern Philippines since early 2004, ordered
other KOMPAK members to dispatch suicide bombers to the Philippines.
Abdullah Sonata asserted that he sent ten although only four got
through.[31]
<http://www.meforum.
n31>
It is clear, therefore, that the KOMPAK network, funded by Saudi charities,
helped develop Jemaah Islamiyah. It also illustrates clearly that terrorist
organizations can be created from social networks.
Hambali, Jemaah Islamiyah's top operative in Malaysia, established other
charities including Pertubahan el Hassan, as conduits for funds to both
Jemaah Islamiyah, its paramilitaries in the Moluccas, and the Medical
Emergency Relief Charity. Initially, these charities served as ancillary
organizations used to assist with jihadist activities. Over the last two
years, however, Jemaah Islamiyah has begun to focus far more on charities.
While the Indonesian military has made inroads tracking down terrorist
leaders, the Indonesian government has been more willing to tolerate Jemaah
Islamiyah charities in the belief that it can wean Jemaah Islamiyah leaders
from violence and that it is better to have them involved in overt and
nonviolent activities. Jakarta has, therefore, been unwilling to enforce
United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee or U.S. Department of the
Treasury designations, which make it illegal to raise funds for or donate to
any proscribed individual or organization. The Indonesian government's
strategy appears to mirror that of the Lebanese government's strategy with
regard to Hezbollah. Beirut and many Western powers long tolerated
Hezbollah, convinced that incorporating it into the Lebanese government
might moderate the group. However, in Lebanon, such accommodation backfired
precisely because the charities were only one aspect of a much broader
strategy that included immutable commitment to jihad.
Tsunami and Earthquake
The December 2004 tsunami and the May 2006 earthquake in central Java, both
massive humanitarian crises, provide a window into just how Jemaah Islamiyah
and its charities operate to further Islamist agendas.
On December 26, 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Sumatra caused a
tsunami which killed more than 165,000 Indonesians and displaced half a
million others. Jakarta, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster,
sought to tap Jemaah Islamiyah's social service network. On January 4, 2005,
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia dispatched the first group of seventy-seven
volunteers to Aceh from their Yogyakarta based headquarters.
<http://www.meforum.
n32> Among them was a top Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia official who was a
suspect in the October 12, 2002 Bali blast that killed 202 people.[33]
<http://www.meforum.
n33> Not all Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia personnel were engaged explicitly
in humanitarian work; the group indicated that their primary goal was to
provide "spiritual guidance" to victims, assist in the reconstruction of
mosques, and guard against proselytizing by non-Muslim relief agencies.
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's non-humanitarian agenda led the Indonesian Air
Force to expel nineteen Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia members from Aceh on
January 11, 2005.[34]
<http://www.meforum.
n34>
Abdurrahman'
relevance. Founded in January 2000 by Abdurrahman and Hambali, both of whom
had experience fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, the group fielded
approximately 500 armed combatants in the Moluccas who were equipped with
high-speed motor boats, which they used to attack remote Christian and Hindu
communities. After the tsunami, they established four base camps in Aceh
including one outside the airport, adjacent to the camps of other domestic
and international relief organizations, beneath a sign that read, "Islamic
Law Enforcement.
concerned with providing "spiritual guidance" and restoring "infrastructure
in places of religious duties," the Laskar Mujahidin was deeply involved in
relief work, including the distribution of aid and especially the burial of
corpses.[35]
<http://www.meforum.
n35> Though the organization is vehemently anti-American, it gave cautious
backing to the presence of U.S. and Australian troops.[36]
<http://www.meforum.
n36> It was clear, however, that their lobbying did persuade the government
to call for the early departure of foreign troops.
Joining Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and Laskar Mujahidin was the Medical
Emergency Relief Charity (MERC), an Indonesian executor agency for Saudi
funding.[37]
<http://www.meforum.
n37> Established on August 14, 1999, amidst sectarian fighting, MERC now
has twelve offices in Indonesia, concentrated in the regions most directly
affected by sectarian violence. In 2000-01, MERC produced two
well-publicized jihadi videos for fundraising purposes.[38]
<http://www.meforum.
n38> While MERC was never directly implicated in supporting Laskar
Jundullah and Laskar Mujahidin paramilitary operations to the degree that
KOMPAK was, its one-sided approach to the Moluccas conflict, as well as the
actions of some individual members, raised suspicions. There is some
evidence that MERC received funding from the Indonesian branch of the
Saudi-funded International Islamic Relief Organization.
<http://www.meforum.
n39> MERC operations abroad, in particular in Iraq, the Palestinian
territories, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, have also raised concerns about it
being a conduit for terrorist funding. MERC sent a team of four doctors and
other staff to Iraq in 2003. In 2004, U.S. forces killed one MERC employee,
an ambulance driver, in a firefight. The group's website stated that they
operate in the tribal areas of Pakistan with the support and permission of
the Taliban. Other Islamist organizations such as the Islamic Defenders
Front and Hizb ut-Tahrir, though not directly connected to Jemaah Islamiyah,
have also become active in Aceh in the wake of the tsunami. Both groups have
engaged in sectarian violence.[40]
<http://www.meforum.
n40>
The Islamist charities flocked to Aceh for three reasons. The first was to
garner good press and media attention, providing a needed makeover for
groups associated with terrorism and sectarian violence while simultaneously
highlighting the secular government's failure. Second, the Islamist
charities sought to counter any Western influence.[41]
<http://www.meforum.
n41> Hence, Din Syamsudin, the head of the quasi-official Indonesian Ulema
Council and president of the second largest Muslim organization in the
country, Muhammadiyah, who has subsequently acted as a fundraiser for Hamas,
warned:
All nongovernmental organizations, either domestic or international ... This
is a reminder. Do not do this [proselytize] in this kind of situation. The
Muslim community will not remain quiet. This is a clear statement, and it is
serious.[42]
<http://www.meforum.
n42>
Paranoia about Western influence has become a prime motivator for Islamist
groups in the Middle East. Prior to the rise of Al-Qaeda, for example, Saudi
clergy preached that the Muslim world was subject to a Western "cultural
attack" and "intellectual attack." In 1981, the World Muslim League, a Saudi
NGO, published a book entitled, The Means of Combating the Intellectual
Attack on the Muslim World, which highlighted a theme developed by 'Abdullah
'Azzam, a professor at King 'Abd al-'Aziz University in Jeddah and mentor to
Osama bin Laden.[43]
<http://www.meforum.
n43> Defense against a "cultural NATO" is a theme that Iranian hardliners
have also recently adapted.[44]
<http://www.meforum.
n44> Hence, almost two years after the tsunami, Ba'asyir declared that
"naked women are more dangerous than bombs" in his salvo about spiritual
pollution and Western culture and values degrading Islam from within.[45]
<http://www.meforum.
n45>
Third, these groups saw the disaster as an opportunity to proselytize.
Several groups in addition to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia indicated that
their primary goal was to provide "spiritual guidance" to victims, ensure
that Islamic law was being followed, and to assist in the reconstruction of
mosques. With 400,000 refugees and mosques at the center of rural community
relief efforts, the potential for influence was great.[46]
<http://www.meforum.
n46>
The cynicism of the Islamist parties grated on local political movements.
While Aceh is nearly 100 percent Muslim, the Acehenese secessionist
movement, the Free Aceh Movement known by its acronym GAM (Gerakan Aceh
Meredeka), urged the international community to force the Islamist groups to
leave in apparent frustration with the government's unwillingness to do so:
We therefore call on the international community to demand that the FPI
[Front Pembela Islam] and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia leave Acheh . The FPI
and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia are not welcome in Acheh and have never been
supported by the Achenese people, nor has their presence been requested. The
FPI has been involved in sectarian killings in Maluku and Central Sulawesi
and illegal attacks against non-Muslims and others in Java and elsewhere.
Their intervention in Aceh is therefore counterproductive.
<http://www.meforum.
n47>
Tsunami relief efforts provided a template for subsequent operations, most
notably in the May 27, 2006 earthquake in central Java. The magnitude 6.2
earthquake killed more than 6,000 people, injured 78,000, and left up to 1.5
million homeless. The United Nations' World Food Program moved quickly into
central Java and chose Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia as one of eight partner
organizations to deliver ninety-five tons of food aid. The Australian
government immediately protested Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia's contract,[48]
<http://www.meforum.
n48> but World Food Program spokesman Barry Came said, "We don't pick
groups to distribute aid based on their religious or political beliefs. We
choose based on the ability to deliver, and so far they've performed up to
standard. We have no complaints."
<http://www.meforum.
n49> He backed down, however, under international pressure.[50]
<http://www.meforum.
n50> Both Ba'asyir and Abdurrahman had been proscribed under U.N. Security
Council 1267 Committee lists as specially designated terrorist financiers,
and Ba'asyir, just released from prison, was reportedly planning to deliver
the World Food Program aid personally.[
<http://www.meforum.
n51>
The episode highlights a major problem facing the West when combating
Islamism: The United Nations and international agencies either refuse to
perform due diligence or use moral equivalency to justify support for
Islamist organizations. Not only do such organizations receive Saudi support
as they pursue sectarian radicalization, but too often they also indirectly
receive subsidies from Western taxpayers who fund international
organizations.
Conclusion
The Hezbollah model is not new to terrorist organizations, but it is new to
Jemaah Islamiyah. Jemaah Islamiyah has taken advantage of an opening:
Political will in Indonesia to dismantle terrorist infrastructure has waned
as the nature of the group's militancy has become apparent. Released from
prison, the group's leaders have been able to focus on political, religious,
and charitable work. The civilian infrastructure they have developed will
make the group-still committed to terrorism-more durable over the long term.
Policymakers in Indonesia need to understand precedent. The existence of
charities and social service networks has not made Hamas or Hezbollah any
less violent although they have contributed to de-legitimization of
governments. The Indonesian government should do what the Lebanese, Israeli,
and Palestinian Authority governments did not: They must uproot social
networks. Few governments have put forward a comprehensive strategy for
dealing with the phenomenon of the inverse triangle, and most disaggregate
the terrorist and social welfare arms and fund raising.
There is intense international pressure on the Indonesian government to ban
Jemaah Islamiyah, but no politician in the world's largest Muslim community
has the political courage to do so. As Indonesia's top counterterrorism
official, Ansyaad Mbai, stated, the reason there is no ban on Jemaah
Islamiyah "is because the political situation is still very sensitive."[
<http://www.meforum.
n52> Complacency and political expediency rule the day in Jakarta. As long
as Jemaah Islamiyah members do not blow things up or simply target Western
interests, Jakarta will do little.
It is not just courts and counterterrorism officials who have grown
frustrated. A handful of Muslim reformers and liberals have been at the
center of a push to rewrite Law No. 8 (1995) on nongovernmental
organizations to tighten both the process of NGO incorporation and increase
oversight. The proposed law will make fundraising by unregistered (or
de-registered) NGOs illegal. The proposed law would make Jemaah Islamiyah's
fundraising illegal under Indonesian domestic law.[53]
<http://www.meforum.
n53>
This unwillingness to take on terrorist infrastructure is regrettable.
First, like Hezbollah and Hamas, Jemaah Islamiyah has a long-term timetable.
Second, by pursuing overt strategies, Jemaah Islamiyah is able to forge
closer ties and common cause with Islamists who might otherwise eschew their
violence. Many Indonesians no longer see Jemaah Islamiyah as a radical
fringe organization even though the group's agenda has not changed. Third,
there is little evidence that Jemaah Islamiyah will abandon terrorism.
Tactics may shift, but strategy does not. Herein, Hamas again provides an
example that should worry Indonesian authorities. Its assumption of
political control in Gaza has not tempered its commitment to terrorism;
indeed, Hamas has become even more aggressive since the January 2006
Palestinian elections.
Herein, Washington and other Western governments have an interest. Indonesia
may be half a world away from the United States, but any Islamist gains in
the archipelago nation will have profound repercussions on U.S. national
security. Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world, and the
United States should not cede the Indonesian population to the same
Saudi-funded Islamists who radicalized their Arab brethren, recruited
unencumbered for years in Afghan and Pakistani refugee camps, and profess an
inflexible hatred of the United States, Israel, and the West. Washington
should pressure Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to uproot Jemaah
Islamiyah's overt presence and cede them no political space where they can
recruit and indoctrinate anew. Targeting their financial and social networks
is essential to the long-term fight against terrorism.
Zachary Abuza is a professor of political science at Simmons College and
author of Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Lynne
Rienner, 2003), Muslims,
<http://www.routledg
bn9780415461061> Politics and Violence in Indonesia (Routledge, 2006), and
Conspiracy of Silence: Islam and Insurgency in Thailand (U.S. Institute of
Peace, forthcoming 2009).
[1]
<http://www.meforum.
nref1> "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," Asia Report,
no. 43, International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels, Dec. 11, 2002; "Jemaah
Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous," Asia Report, no.
63, idem, Aug. 26, 2003.
[2]
<http://www.meforum.
nref2> The New York Times, July 4,
<http://www.nytimes.
[3]
<http://www.meforum.
nref3> Lawrence Wright, "The Rebellion Within," The New Yorker, June 2,
2008.
[4]
<http://www.meforum.
nref4> "Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi," Asia Report,
no. 74, International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels, Feb. 3, 2004.
[5]
<http://www.meforum.
nref5> The Observer (London), Nov.
<http://www.guardian
2005; SperoNews, Nov.
<http://www.sperofor
t=Indonesian+
[6]
<http://www.meforum.
nref6> Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2004
<http://articles.
[7]
<http://www.meforum.
nref7> "Indonesia: Jemaah
<http://www.crisisgr
Industry," Asia Report, no. 147, International Crisis Group, Feb. 28, 2008.
[8]
<http://www.meforum.
nref8> See parallels, for example, in Israel Elad-Altman, "Democracy,
Elections, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
Ideology, Feb. 2006.
[9]
<http://www.meforum.
nref9> Raphael Israeli, "The Islamic <http://www.jcpa.
Movement in Israel," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Oct. 15, 1999.
[10]
<http://www.meforum.
nref10> See, for example, Augustus Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 152-60.
[11]
<http://www.meforum.
nref11> See, for example, Alistair Crooke and Vanessa Shields, "The Road
Ahead: Perspectives
<http://www.c-
Disarming Hamas," Conciliation Resources, London, June 2005.
[12]
<http://www.meforum.
nref12> Author interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Ngruki, Solo, June 11,
2002.
[13]
<http://www.meforum.
nref13> Author interview with Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia officials,
Yogyakarta, June 12-13, 2002; Korgres Mujahidini Dan Penegakan Syari'ah
Islam (Yogyakarta: Widah Press, 2001); "Should Not Fear Being Called
'Radical,'" Farish Noor interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Al-Jazeera
television (Doha), Aug. 21, 2006.
[14]
<http://www.meforum.
nref14> Al-Jazeera, Aug. 21, 2006.
[15]
<http://www.meforum.
nref15> Fatima Astuti, "Speculation on <http://www.fkmcpr.
Formalizing Jemaah Islamiyah," IDSS Commentaries, The Institute of Defence
and Strategic Studies, Singapore, Aug. 9, 2006.
[16]
<http://www.meforum.
nref16> Ibid <http://www.fkmcpr.
[17]
<http://www.meforum.
nref17> Luthfi Assyaukanie, "The Rise of Religious
<http://www3.
Bylaws in Indonesia," RSIS Commentaries, Rajarathnam School of International
Studies, Singapore, Mar. 29, 2007.
[18]
<http://www.meforum.
nref18> The Sunday Times (London), July
<http://www.timesonl
ffset=0&page=
[19]
<http://www.meforum.
nref19> Ba'asyir, "Should Not Fear Being Called 'Radical.'"
[20]
<http://www.meforum.
nref20> Author's copy of video, untitled and undated.
[21]
<http://www.meforum.
nref21> Author interview with Irfan Awwas, Yogyakarta, July 13, 2002.
[22]
<http://www.meforum.
nref22> See for example, IslamOnline.
<http://www.islamonl
2006.
[23]
<http://www.meforum.
nref23> Author interviews at Al-Haramain'
[24]
<http://www.meforum.
nref24> "Interrogation Report of Omar al-Faruq," Badan Intelijen Negara
(State intelligence agency) Jakarta, June 2002.
[25]
<http://www.meforum.
nref25> Author's personal observation.
[26]
<http://www.meforum.
nref26> "Security Council Committee Adds One Individual, One Entity to
Al-Qaida Sections of Consolidated
<http://www.un.
Council, SC/8801, Aug. 4, 2006.
[27]
<http://www.meforum.
nref27> Time, Sept. 23, 2003.
[28]
<http://www.meforum.
nref28> Author interview with H. Asep R. Jayanegara, secretary, Komite
Penanggulangan Krisis, Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, Jakarta, Jan. 8, 2003.
[29]
<http://www.meforum.
nref29> Zachary Abuza, "Funding
<http://www.nbr.
8f8a1ef> Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and
Jemaah Islamiyah," NBR Analysis, The National Bureau of Asian Research,
Seattle, Dec. 2003.
[30]
<http://www.meforum.
nref30> The Jakarta Post, Jan. 10, 2006.
[31]
<http://www.meforum.
nref31> Abdullah Sunata, Philippine National Police, debriefing report,
Aug. 12, 2005.
[32]
<http://www.meforum.
nref32> "Baasyir's Mujahidin Bound for Aceh," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 4, 2004.
[33]
<http://www.meforum.
nref33> Kyodo News International, Inc., Dec.
<http://findarticles
2002; The Australian (Sydney), Feb. 24, 2005.
[34]
<http://www.meforum.
nref34> "Military Expels Some Mujahidin from Aceh," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 11,
2005.
[35]
<http://www.meforum.
nref35> "Baasyir's Mujahidin Bound for Aceh," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 4, 2004.
[36]
<http://www.meforum.
nref36> Associated Press, Jan. 7, 2004.
[37]
<http://www.meforum.
nref37> "Database of Terrorist Organizations and Activities," The
Information Project, accessed Oct. 7, 2008; Eusaquito P. Manalo, "The
Philippine Response to Terrorism: The Abu Sayyaf Group," (MA diss., Naval
Postgraduate School, Dec. 2004), p. 56. The MERC website has been closed or
moved.
[38]
<http://www.meforum.
nref38> "Pasir Hitum Teluk Galela" and "Dan Kesaksian Pun Menangis,"
previously available from the MERC website.
[39]
<http://www.meforum.
nref39> Executive Order 13224
<http://www.state.
Department; U.N. 1267 Committee, Aug. 3, 2006.
[40]
<http://www.meforum.
nref40> The Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 2008.
[41]
<http://www.meforum.
nref41> "PKS Wants Foreign Troops Removed," Laksamana.Net, Jan. 11, 2004.
[42]
<http://www.meforum.
nref42> Associated Press, Jan. 14, 2005.
[43]
<http://www.meforum.
nref43> Uriya Shavit, "Al-Qaeda's
<http://www.meforum.
East Quarterly, Fall 2006, p. 3-13.
[44]
<http://www.meforum.
nref44> Qods (Tehran), Nov.
<http://www.qudsdail
2007; Islamic Student News Agency (Tehran), Mar. 2, 2008; Sobh-e Sadeq
(Tehran), June <http://www.sobhesad
[45]
<http://www.meforum.
nref45> The Jakarta Post, Sept. 21, 2006.
[46]
<http://www.meforum.
nref46> The New York Times, Aug. 1, 2006.
[47]
<http://www.meforum.
nref47> Free Aceh Movement (GAM), news release, The Acheh Times, Jan. 10,
2005 <http://www.news.
[48]
<http://www.meforum.
nref48> "Downer
<http://64.233.
%2520465.pdf+
=en&ct=clnk&
Nations Association of Australia, Garran, no. 465, June 16, 2006.
[49]
<http://www.meforum.
nref49> Associated Press, June 14, 2006
<http://www.msnbc.
[50]
<http://www.meforum.
nref50> ABC News, June 15, 2006
<http://www.abc.
(Australia), June 16, 2006
<http://www.news.
[51]
<http://www.meforum.
nref51> Associated Press, June 14, 2006
<http://www.msnbc.
[52]
<http://www.meforum.
nref52> "Jemaah Islamiyah to be Banned," Laksamana.net, Mar. 21, 2005.
[53]
<http://www.meforum.
nref53> Author interview with a drafter of the proposed law and a
consultant to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Jakarta, July 8, 2008.
Related Topics: Radical Islam
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