*IBRAHIM ISA'S FOCUS : *
"*THE THIRTIETH SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT – G30S – 1965*
*AND THE MASS MURDER IN INDONESIA*
*Saturday, September 2011*
*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*
Fortysix years ago, in the early hours of October 1, 1965, a group of
Indonesian Officers started the socalled "Gerakan 30 September", the
"G30S", as it became known to the public.
Failure of this 'coup', led to a wave of persecusion, arrestation, and
mass murder in Indonesia. The victims are Communists, suspected
Communists and followers and supporters of President Sukarno.
More than one million innocent people were victimized, accused of being
involved in the "G30S" coup.
Follows are --- news and views on the "G30S" and what happened after its
failure. The biggest and most serious violations of Human Rights since
the establishment of the Republic Of Indonesia.
That is the greatest mass murder committed by apparatus of the state in
collusion with political and religious forces, then the establishment of
General Suharto's ORBA, the Orde Baru, the New Order regime which lasted
for 32 years, until May 22, 1998, in which President Suharto was
overthrown by the people's movement and demand for "REFORMASI" and
"DEMOKRASI", May 1998.
* * *
*WIKIPEDIA* -- On the "Thirtieth September Movement":
/Gerakan 30 September/, abbreviated as *G30S*) was a self-proclaimed
organization of Indonesian National Armed Froces members who, in the
early hours of 1 October 1965, assassinated six Army Genrals in an
abortive coup d'état <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%E9tat>_._
Later that morning, the organization declared that it was in control of
media and communication outlets and had taken President Sukrnounder its
protection.
By the end of the day, the coup attempt had failed in Jakarta at least.
Meanwhile in central Java there was an attempt to take control over an
army division and several cities. By the time this rebellion was put
down, two more senior officers were dead.
In the days and weeks that followed, the army blamed the coup attempt on
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Soona campaign of mass killing was
underway, which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of
alleged communists.
The group's name was more commonly abbreviated "G30S/PKI" by those
wanting to associate it with the PKI, and propaganda would refer to the
group as /Gestapu/ (for its similarity to "Gestapo", the name of tghe
Nazi Secret Police.
* * *
Events in Central Java
Following the 7AM radio broadcast, troops from the Diponegoro Division
in Central Java took control of five of the seven divisions in the name
of the 30 September movement .The PKI
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Indonesia> mayor of
Solo <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surakarta> issued a statement in
support of the movement. Rebel troops in Yogyakarta, led by Major
Muljono, kidnapped and later killed Col. Katamso
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katamso> and his chief of staff Lt. Col.
Sugijono. However, once news of the movement's failure in Jakarta became
known, most of its followers in Central Java gave themselves up.
*ANTI -COMMUNIST PURGE*
Main article: INDONESIAN KILLINGS OF 1965-66
Contemporary anti-PKI literature blaming the party for the coup attempt
Suharto and his associates immediately blamed the PKI as masterminds of
the 30 September Movement. With the support of the Army, and fueled by
horrific tales of the alleged torture and mutilation of the generals at
Lubang Buaya, anti-PKI demonstrations and then violence soon broke out.
Violent mass action started in Aceh, then shifted to Central and East
Java. Suharto then sent the RPKAD paratroops under Col. Sarwo Edhie to
Central Java. When they arrived in Semarang
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semarang>, locals burned the PKI
headquarters to the ground]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-HUGHES_160-17>
The army swept through the countryside and were aided by locals in
killing suspected communists. In East Java, members of Ansor, the youth
wing of the Nahdlatul Ulama
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nahdlatul_Ulama> went on a killing frenzy,
and the slaughter later spread to Bali
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bali>. Figures given for the number of
people killed across Indonesia vary from 78,000 to one million.[19]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-Sundhaussen_218-18>
Among the dead was Aidit, who was captured by the Army on 25 November
and summarily executed shortly after.[2
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-Sundhaussen_217-19>
Theories about the 30 September Movement
A PKI coup attempt: The "official" (New Order) version
The Army leadership began making accusations of PKI
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Indonesia> involvement
at an early stage. Later, the government of President Suharto
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suharto> would reinforce this impression
by referring to the movement using the abbreviation "G30S/PKI". School
textbooks followed the official government line[22]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-21> that
the PKI, worried about Sukarno's health and concerned about their
position should he die, acted to seize power and establish a communist
state. The trials of key conspirators were used as evidence to support
this view, as was the publication of a cartoon supporting the 30
September Movement in the 2 October issue of the PKI magazine /Harian
Rakyat (People's Daily)/. According to later pronouncements by the army,
the PKI manipulated gullible left-wing officers such as Untung through a
mysterious "special bureau" that reported only to the party secretary,
Aidit. This case relied on a confession by the alleged head of the
bureau, named Sjam <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kamaruzaman_Sjam>,
during a staged trial in 1967. But it was never convincingly proved to
Western academic specialists, and has been challenged by some Indonesian
accounts.[23]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-SMH_McDONALD-22>
THE PLOTTERS
The reason given by those involved in the 30 September movement was that
it was to prevent a planned seizure of power by a "Council of Generals"
(/Dewan Jenderal/). They claimed to be acting to save Sukarno from these
officers allegedly led by Nasution and including Yani, who had planned a
coup on Armed Forces Day – 5 October.
INTERNAL ARMY AFFAIR
*Main article: CORNELL PAPERS – BENEDICT ANDERSON*
In 1971, *BENEDICT ANDERSON*-- and Ruth McVey wrote an article which
came to be known as the Cornell paper. In the essay they proposed that
the 30 September Movement was indeed entirely an internal army affair as
the PKI had claimed. They claimed that the action was a result of
dissatisfaction on the part of junior officers who found it extremely
difficult to obtain promotions and because of hostility toward the
generals because of their corrupt and decadent lifestyles. They allege
that the PKI was deliberately involved by, for example, bringing Aidit
to Halim: a diversion from the embarrassing fact the Army was behind the
movement.
Recently Anderson expanded on his theory that the coup attempt was
almost totally an internal matter of a divided military with the PKI
playing only a peripheral role; that the right-wing generals
assassinated on 1 October 1965 were, in fact, the Council of Generals
coup planning to assassinate Sukarno and install themselves as a
military junta <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_junta>. Anderson
argues that G30S was indeed a movement of officers loyal to Sukarno who
carried out their plan believing it would preserve, not overthrow,
Sukarno's rule. The boldest claim in the Anderson theory, however, is
that Suharto was in fact privy to the G30S assassination plot.
Central to the Anderson theory is an examination of a little-known
figure in the Indonesian army, Colonel Abdul Latief. Latief had spent a
career in the Army and, according to Anderson, had been both a staunch
Sukarno loyalist and a friend with Suharto. Following the coup attempt,
however, Latief was jailed and named a conspirator in G30S. At his
military trial in the 1970s, Latief made the accusation that Suharto
himself had been a co-conspirator in the G30S plot, and had betrayed the
group for his own purposes.
Anderson points out that Suharto himself has twice admitted to meeting
Latief in a hospital on the 30 September 1965 (i.e. G30S) and that his
two narratives of the meeting are contradictory. In an interview with
American journalist Arnold Brackman, Suharto stated that Latief had been
there merely "to check" on him, as his son was receiving care for a
burn. In a later interview with /Der Spiegel/
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der_Spiegel>, Suharto stated that Latief
had gone to the hospital in an attempt on his life, but had lost his
nerve. Anderson believes that in the first account, Suharto was simply
being disingenuous; in the second, that he had lied.
Further backing his claim, Anderson cites circumstantial evidence
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circumstantial_evidence> that Suharto was
indeed in on the plot. Among these are:
*
That almost all the key military participants named a part of G30S
were, either at the time of the assassinations or just previously,
close subordinates of Suharto: Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, Colonel
Latief, and Brigadier-General Supardjoin Jakarta, and Colonel
Suherman, Major Usman, and their associates at the Diponegoro
Division's HQ in Semarang.
*
That in the case of Untung and Latief, their association with
Suharto was so close that attended each others' family events and
celebrated their sons' rites of passage together.
*
That the two generals who had direct command of all troops in
Jakarta (save for the Presidential Guard, who carried out the
assassinations) were Suharto and Jakarta Military Territory
Commander Umar Wirahadikusumah . Neither of these figures were
assassinated, and (if Anderson's theory that Suharto lied about an
attempt on his life by Latief) no attempt was even made.
*
That during the time period in which the assassination plot was
organized, Suharto (as commander of Kostrad) had made a habit of
acting in a duplicitous manner: while Suharto was privy to command
decisions in Confrontation the intelligence chief of his unit Ali
Murtopo had been making connections and providing information to
the hostile governments of Malaysia, Singapore, United Kingdom,
and the United States through an espionage operation run by Benny
Moerdani in Thailand. Murdani later became a spy chief in
Suharto's government.
Anderson's theory, for all the exhaustive research it has entailed,
still leaves open a number of questions of interpretation. If, as
Anderson believes, Suharto did have inside knowledge of the G30S plot,
this still leaves open several possibilities: (1) that Suharto had truly
taken part in the plot and defected; (2) that he had been acting as a
spy for the Council of Generals; or (3) that he was uninterested
completely in the factional struggle of G30S and Council of Generals.
Given that Suharto has since died these questions are unlikely to be
answered easily.
SUHARTO WITH CIA SUPPORT
Professor Dale Scott alleges that the entire movement was designed to
allow for Suharto's response. He draws attention to the fact the side of
Lapangan Medeka on which KOSTRAD HQ was situated was not occupied, and
that only those generals who might have prevented Suharto seizing power
(except Nasution) were kidnapped. He also alleges that the fact that the
generals were killed near an air force base where PKI members had been
trained allowed him to shift the blame away from the Army. He links the
support given by the CIA to anti-Sukarno rebels in the 1950s to their
later support for Suharto and anti-communist forces. He points out that
training in the US of Indonesian Army personnel continued even as overt
military assistance dried up. Another damaging revelation came to light
when it emerged that one of the main plotters, Col Latief was a close
associate of Suharto, as were other key figures in the movement, and
that Latief actually visited Suharto on the night before the murders
(Wertheim, 1970)
BRITISH SPYOPS
The role of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office and intelligence service
has also come to light, in a series of exposés by Paul Lashmar and
Oliver James in //INDEPENDENT newspaper beginning in 1997. These
revelations have also come to light in journals on military and
intelligence history.
The revelations included an anonymous Foreign Office source stating that
the decision to unseat Pres. Sukarno was made by Prime Minister Harold
Macmillanthen executed under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. According to
the exposés, the United Kingdom had already become alarmed with the
announcement of the Konfrontasi policy. It has been claimed that a CIA
memorandum of 1962 indicated that Prime Minister Macmillan and President
John F. Kennedy were increasingly alarmed by the possibility of the
Confrontation with Malaysia spreading, and agreed to "liquidate
President Sukarno, depending on the situation and available
opportunities." However, the documentary evidence does not support this
claim.
To weaken the regime, the Foregin Office's Information Research
Department (IRD) coordinated psychological operationsin concert with the
British military, to spread black propaganda
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_propaganda> casting the PKI, the
Chinese and Sukarno in a bad light. These efforts were to duplicate the
successes of British Psyop campaign in the Malayan Emergency.
Of note, these efforts were coordinated from the British High Commission
in Singapore <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore> where the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BBC>), (AP),
and New York Times <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York_Times> filed
their reports on the Indonesian turmoil. According to Roland Challis,
the BBC correspondent who was in Singapore at the time, journalists were
open to manipulation by IRD because of Sukarno's stubborn refusal to
allow them into the country: "In a curious way, by keeping
correspondents out of the country Sukarno made them the victims of
official channels, because almost the only information you could get was
from the British ambassador in Jakarta."
These manipulations included the BBC reporting that Communists were
planning to slaughter the citizens of Jakarta. The accusation was based
solely on a forgery planted by Norman Reddaway, a propaganda expert with
the IRD. He later bragged in a letter to the British ambassador in
Jakarta, Sir Andrew Gilchrist that it "went all over the world and back
again," and was "put almost instantly back into Indonesia via the BBC."
Sir Andrew Gilchrist himself informed the Foreign Office on 5 October
1965: "I have never concealed from you my belief that a little shooting
in Indonesia would be an essential preliminary to effective change."
In the 16 April 2000 /Independent/, Sir Denis Healey, Secretary of State
for Defence
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secretary_of_State_for_Defence>, at the
time of the war, confirmed that the IRD was active during this time. He
officially denied any role by MI6, and denied "personal knowledge" of
the British arming the right-wing faction of the Army, though he did
comment that if there were such a plan, he "would certainly have
supported it."
Although the British MI6 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MI6> is strongly
implicated in this scheme by the use of the Information Research
Department (seen as an MI6 office), any role by MI6 itself is officially
denied by the UK government, and papers relating to it have yet to be
declassified by the Cabinet Office
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_Office>. (/The Independent/, 6
December 2000)
SUKARNO'S PLOT, Victor Fic.
In a book first published in India in 2005, which draws extensively on
the evidence presented at the trials of the conspirators, VICTOR FIC
claims that Aidit and the PKI decided to mount a preemptive strike
against the senior army generals to forestall an army takeover. He
alleges that Sukarno had met with representatives of the Chinese
government and had agreed to retire in exile in China. Following the
purge of the generals, the president would appoint a Mutual Cooperation
(/Gotong Royong/) cabinet and then retire on grounds of ill-health.
Should he not agree to do so, he would be "dispatched" under the
protection of the PKI.
* * *
JOHN ROOSA'S BOOK:
INCOMPETENT PLOTTERS ; THE ARMY TAKES ADVANTAGE
In a 2007 book on the 30 September Movement, Professor John Roosa
dismisses the official version of events, saying it was "imposed by
force of arms" and "partly based on black propaganda and torture-induced
confessions." He points out that Suharto never satisfactorily explained
away the fact that most of the movement's protagonists were Army
officers. However, he does concede that some elements of the PKI were
involved.
Similarly, he asks why, if the movement was planned by military
officers, as alleged in the "Cornell Paper", was it so poorly planned.
In any case, he says, the movement's leaders were too disparate a group
to find enough common ground to carry out the operation.[25]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-ROOSA72-24>
He claims that US officials and certain Indonesian Army officers had
already outlined a plan in which the PKI would be blamed for an
attempted coup, allowing for the party's suppression and the
installation of a military regime under Sukarno as a figurehead
president.Once the 30 September Movement acted, the US gave the
Indonesian military encouragement and assistance in the destruction of
the PKI, including supplying lists of party members and radio
equipment.[26]
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/30_September_Movement#cite_note-ROOSA1935-25>
As to the movement itself,
*Roosa concludes that it was led by Sjam, in collaboration with Aidit,
but */*not*/*the party**as a whole, together with Pono, Untung and
Latief. Suharto was able to defeat the movement because of he knew of it
beforehand and because the Army had already prepared for such a
contingency. He says Sjam was the link between the PKI members and the
Army officers, but that the fact there was no proper coordination was a
major reason for the failure of the movement as a whole.*
* * *
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